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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4633
Recent estimates of the welfare cost of consumption 
volatility find that it is significant in developing 
nations, where it may reach an equivalent of reducing 
consumption by 10 percent per year.  Hence, examining 
the determinants of consumption volatility is of utmost 
relevance. Based on cross-country data for the period 
1960-2005, the paper explains consumption volatility 
using three sets of variables:  one refers to the volatility of 
income and the persistence of income shocks; the second 
set of variables refers to policy volatility, considering the 
volatility of public spending and the size of government; 
while the third set captures the ability of agents to 
smooth shocks, and includes the depth of the domestic 
This paper—a product of the Policy Review Unit, Development Economics Vice-Presidency—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to analyze the effects of public policy and its relationship with consumption volatility in developing 
countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at sherrera@worldbank.org, bruno.vincent@polytechnique.org.
financial markets as well as the degree of integration 
to international capital markets. To allow for potential 
endogenous regressors, in particular the volatility of fiscal 
policy and the size of government, the system is estimated 
using the instrumental variables method.  The results 
indicate that, besides income volatility, the variables with 
the largest and most robust impact on consumption 
volatility are government size and the volatility of public 
spending. Results also show that deeper and more stable 
domestic financial markets reduce the volatility of 
consumption, and that more integrated financial markets 
to the international capital markets are associated with 
lower volatility of consumption. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Several papers have estimated the welfare cost of consumption or output volatility in 
developing countries, and though there is a wide range of variation in results across 
countries, a general finding is that the cost is significantly higher than in developed 
nations; the average cost in a sample of countries may reach the equivalent of reducing 
household consumption by 10 percent (Atahasoulis and van Wincoop, 2000; Pallage and 
Robes, 2003; De Ferranti, et.al. 2000; Herrera, 2007).  Given this extraordinarily high 
cost, it seems relevant determining the causes of consumption volatility and its 
relationship with economic policy.  
 
Previous papers have focused on the determinants of output volatility.  In particular, 
Fatas and Mihov have written a series of papers on this topic (2003, 2004, 2005), and this 
one follows closely their methodology to examine the determinants of consumption 
volatility.  The explanation of consumption volatility is based on three sets of variables:  
one referring to the volatility of income and the persistence of income shocks; the second 
set refers to policy volatility, considering the volatility of public spending and the size of 
government; the third set captures the ability of agents to smooth shocks, and includes the 
depth of the domestic financial markets as well as their integration to international capital 
markets.   
 
The paper has four main sections.  Section 2 presents stylized facts concerning output, 
consumption, and government spending across the world in the period 1960-2005.  
Section 3 discusses the construction of our indicator of fiscal policy volatility.  Section 4 
explores the relationship between fiscal policy volatility and household consumption 
volatility, and Section 5 presents the results of the analysis. Section 6 provides a 
conclusion and directions for further research. 
 
2  Stylized Facts of Government Expenditure, GDP and Consumption 
 
Table 1 shows the average and the standard deviation of the growth rates of GDP, 
household consumption and public spending in the period 1960-2005. Regarding the 
average growth rates, low income countries’ GDP and consumption are the lowest, while 
their public spending grew at the highest rate. The average growth rates of consumption 
and GDP of middle-income and high-income countries are almost identical, but public 
spending growth is significantly higher in middle-income countries. 
 
Regarding the volatility of the three aggregates, it is the highest in the low-income 
counties, and decreases with the group’s income. Public spending is significantly more 
volatile than output and consumption in low and middle-income countries.  Table 2 
shows the volatility of public spending is almost three times the volatility of output in 
HIPC and LDC, while in high income the volatility of output is higher than that of public 
spending.  Table 2 also shows that consumption is more volatile than income in low and 




Table 1: GDP, Consumption and Public Spending: 
Average Growth Rates and Volatility, 1961-2005 
 









Low  income  1.9 2.0 1.1 2.0  5.3  4.5 
Middle  income  2.7 1.7 2.7 1.7  4.6  2.9 
High  income  2.6 1.6 2.5 1.4  2.8  1.3 
Notes: a. Average. b. Standard deviation. Calculations are based on WDI data.  All variables are growth rates. GDP and 





Table 2: Relative Volatilities of Consumption, Output and Public Spending 
 
 Con/GDP  PubSp/GDP  PubSp/Cons 
Low Income  1.0 2.3  2.3 
      HIPC  1.2  2.8  2.6 
      LDC  1.4  2.8  2.0 
Middle Income  1.0 1.7  1.6 
High Income  0.9 0.8  0.9 
      EMU  0.9  0.7  0.7 
 
 
The fact that public spending volatility is higher than that of output and consumption in 
low and middle-income countries is not necessarily problematic.  In fact, it could be 
interpreted as a successful use of a policy instrument to stabilize the target variable 
(output or consumption).  However, the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy in most 
developing countries, explored elsewhere (Alesina and Tabellini, 2005; Talvi and Vegh, 
2005), suggests that fiscal policy may be destabilizing.  This is confirmed by the positive 
association between fiscal policy volatility and output and consumption volatility, as 









                                                 
2 Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the per-capita GDP and consumption growth rates during 




Figure 1: Fiscal Policy Volatility and GDP Volatility 
 
 
Source: Calculations are based on WDI data. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of growth rates. 
 
Figure 2: Fiscal Policy Volatility and Household Consumption Volatility 
 
 
Source: Calculations are based on WDI data. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of growth rates 
 
The relationship between fiscal policy volatility and output volatility (Figure 1) has been 
studied by Fatas and Mihov in a series of papers, but the relationship with consumption   5
volatility (Figure 2) has yet to be examined carefully, which is the objective of this paper. 
The positive association may be due to a third (omitted) variable that affects both. 
 
Figure 3 depicts one last fact worth highlighting, namely the positive association between 
the average growth rate and the volatility of public spending.  The positive association 
can be refined further by noting that there are two distinct groups of countries:  the first, 
composed mostly of the OECD and East Asian economies, shows a positive relationship 
between the variables, but volatility is significantly lower for any level of growth; Chile 
and South Africa are included in this group.  The second group, composed mostly of 
Latin American and African economies, also shows a positive association between the 
average growth rate and the volatility, though much steeper. 
 
The “growth champions”
3 are all on the lower schedule (first group), while the poorer 
countries tend to be on the higher schedule, making it possible that the income level 
explains part of the observed relationship between volatility of public spending and 
consumption volatility. Hence, the remainder of this paper undertakes a more detailed 





Figure 3: Public Spending Growth and Volatility: 1961-2005 
 
 
Source: Calculations are based on WDI data. 
 
                                                 
3 Terminology used by Harberger (2005) referring to a group of fast growing countries in the last decades: 
China, Korea, Thailand, Singapore,Vietnam, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Chile and Malaysia.   6
3  Measuring Fiscal Policy Volatility 
 
The first step of our analysis is to construct an indicator of fiscal policy (or public 
spending) volatility that is independent of the business cycle and reflects discretionary 
policy changes. Following Fatas and Mihov (2003), discretionary fiscal policy is defined 
as the residual εi,t of the following model: 
 
t i i i i i , t i, 1 - t i, t i, t i, W G Y G ε δ γ β α + + Δ + Δ + = Δ    (1) 
 
where: 
-  ΔG is the growth rate of government spending
4; 
-  ΔY is the current output growth; 
-  W is a vector of control variables including inflation and an oil prices.  
 
The volatility of fiscal policy is calculated as the standard deviation of εi,t for any country 
i. 
 
Equation (1) was estimated by individual country regressions and by panel methods, 
using both OLS and instrumental variable (IV) methods, for a total of four alternative 
estimation methods. Individual country regressions have the advantage of allowing 
heterogeneity in the estimated coefficients.
5  The panel specifications adopted in this 
paper impose the coefficient homogeneity assumption, but by including the level of 
income (GDP per capita) among the control variables we control for the potential source 
of bias (described in Figure 3), according to which the poorest countries are more volatile 
simply because of their lower income level.
6  
 
The Instrumental Variables regressions use the following variables to instrument for 
current output growth: two lags of output growth; index of oil prices; lagged inflation; 
lagged value of government spending growth. 
 
The estimates of policy volatility obtained by the individual country regressions (time 
series) and panel methods are relatively similar, and are reported in Appendix 2. Both 
methods yield rankings of countries with a clustering of developed economies at the top 
of the list (low volatility) whereas developing countries, especially those in Africa, 
cluster at the bottom of the list (high volatility).  Appendix 2 also compares the country 
rankings with Fatas-Mihov results, and with a more basic estimate of volatility which is 
the standard deviation of the growth rate during the sample period.  In general, all the 
rankings produce similar results. 
 
                                                 
4 The variables are described in more details (including sources) in Appendix 1. 
5 Fatas-Mihov estimated their fiscal policy volatility variable using this method. 
6 A Hausman test led to rejecting the random effects model in favor of a fixed effects panel.  Commenting a 
previous paper (Herrera, 2007), Allen Schick suggested the necessity of controlling for income level across 
countries, leading to the panel estimations that yield the results in all base cases in the remainder of the 
paper.   7
4  Exploring the Relationship between Consumption Volatility and Fiscal 
Policy Volatility 
 
This section explains consumption volatility with three sets of variables: the first one 
refers to the income generating process, considering both the volatility of income and the 
persistence of income shocks; the second is related to fiscal policy; while the third set of 
variables refers to the agents’ possibilities to smooth income shocks, that depend on the 
financial sector depth as well as its integration to international capital markets. 
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y is the volatility of household consumption – calculated as the standard 
deviation of the growth of household consumption per capita between 1960-2005; 
-  σi
ε is the volatility of fiscal policy – described in the previous section; 
-  Xi is a vector of control variables that reflect mostly the volatility of income and 
persistence of income shocks, as well as the availability of domestic and external 
financing for consumption smoothing. 
 
Xi includes the following variables: 
 
-  Volatility of income; 
-  Persistence of income; 
-  Domestic financial sector development (level and volatility of financial 
liabilities); 
-  Financial openness; 
-  Government size; 
-  Trade variable, defined as the ratio of imports and exports to GDP. 
 
We will now describe in more details some of the explanatory variables that we have 
been using in Equation (2). 
4.1  Income variables: Volatility and persistence of shocks 
 
The empirical testing of the relationship between consumption and income and their 
volatilities has been studied extensively (Christiano, 1987).  Based on the literature, we 
include the volatility of income and the persistence of income shocks as explanatory 
variables for the volatility of household consumption. Intuitively, the higher the volatility 
and the persistence of income shocks, the higher the volatility of household consumption. 
 
These two parameters are estimated with the following augmented Dickey-Fuller 
regression
7: 
                                                 
7 All the variables are in log terms, except the time trend.   8
 
t t t t t t t y y y y y ε β β β β α μ + + Δ + Δ + Δ + + = Δ − − − − . ... . 7 6 6 2 2 1 1 1    (3) 
 
The volatility of income is defined as the standard deviation of εt whereas the persistence 
parameter is defined as 1+α. Some of the specifications that we used included an 
interaction term between both variables. 
4.2  Financial markets: Possibility of smoothing shocks 
 
The possibility of smoothing consumption will depend on the depth and efficiency of 
financial markets. The relationship between household consumption volatility and 
financial markets has been explored recently by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundbal (2006).  
Here we use financial rather than equity market information, simply because of the 
availability of data for the sample period and the large set of countries that we are 
considering. We consider the ratio of total liquid liabilities, defined as the sum of 
currency, demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial 
intermediaries, to GDP. We also include the volatility of financial liabilities. 
 
Finally, the openness of the capital account is captured through the Chinn-Ito Financial 
Openness Variable, because the latter coincides with our period of analysis and is 
available for the entire sample of countries
8. 
 
4.3  Fiscal policy variables: Expenditure volatility and government size 
 
In their study of output volatility, Fatas and Mihov included two variables to describe 
fiscal policy, namely the volatility of fiscal policy and government size.  Fiscal policy 
volatility may be linked to consumption volatility through the connection between public 
and household budgets. Government size itself is found to be associated with higher 
output volatility on several occasions in the literature. 
 
Gali (1994) explains the positive relationship between government size and volatility 
based on the resulting higher labor supply elasticity due to the lower (after tax) labor 
productivity and the resulting lower employment levels
9.  A recent paper looking at 
OECD countries also shows that countries with higher share of government expenditure 
                                                 
8 The Chinn-Ito indicator is very similar to the Kaminsky-Schmukler indicator, but the first one is available 
for a larger set of countries. Interestingly, in their paper, Bekaert et al. did not find any significant 
relationship between capital account openness and consumption volatility. 
9 Gali (1994) uses two variables to capture the size of government: income tax rate and the share of 
government purchases in GDP. According to the basic RBC model that he is using, a higher tax rate 
reduces steady state employment through lower (after tax) labor productivity, thus resulting in higher labor 
supply elasticity and higher output volatility. On the contrary, an increase in the share of government 
purchases in GDP results in higher steady state employment – through its negative wealth effect – and, 
consequently, lower labor supply elasticity and lower output volatility. That is to say the two variables have 
opposite effects on the volatility of output. When increasing simultaneously the two variables, Gali finds 
that the first effect more than offsets the second, thus resulting in an overall positive relationship between 
government size and output volatility.   9
in domestic output show higher sensitivity of their fiscal position to fluctuations in the 
business cycle (Girouard and Andre, 2005). More recently, Angeletos and Panousi (2007) 
explore the supply side effects of government spending and reach a similar conclusion 
but their result operates through a different channel: given the negative wealth effect of 
higher government consumption, individuals become more risk averse, which increases 
the risk premium, thus discouraging investment and leading to lower employment levels. 
This in turn results in higher labor supply elasticity, so that government size again 
behaves as an “automatic destabilizer” rather than the opposite. 
 
To control for endogenous regressors and deal with measurement error problems, we 
followed the Fatas-Mihov instrumental variables estimation procedure.  This is of 
particular importance regarding the volatility of fiscal policy (Equation (1)). Indeed, as 
described in the first part of this paper, countries with higher volatility of consumption 
tend to have more volatile public spending (Table 2), so that fiscal policy volatility could 
be endogenous to consumption volatility. 
 
Following Fatas and Mihov, policy volatility was instrumented with institutional 
characteristics of the electoral and political systems that shape fiscal policy outcomes.  
Such variables include: 
-  the nature of the electoral system (majoritarian vs. proportional); 
-  the nature of the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary); 
-  the number of elections for the executive and legislative branches; 
-  the extent of political constraints on the executive to manipulate fiscal policy. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the regressions of the volatility of fiscal policy on these 




All the instruments – except the number of elections when it is the only regressor – 
appear very strongly correlated with our measure of the volatility of fiscal policy. The 
level of the R-squared of the regression with the four instrumental variables included 
altogether (0.61) gives confidence in the use of these variables as instruments for the 












                                                 
10 The corresponding regressions based on the volatility numbers calculated using individual country 
regressions yielded similar results, which are not mentioned in the paper.   10
Table 3 
Dependent variable: log of fiscal policy volatility (from panel regression) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Majoritarian (1=yes, 0=proportional)  0.667           0.332 
   (0.000)           (0.014) 
Presidential (1=yes, 0=parliamentary)     1.149        0.846 
      (0.000)        (0.000) 
Number of elections        -0.670     -1.729 
         (0.310)     (0.005) 
Political constraints           -2.566  -1.308 
            (0.000)  (0.002) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.15 0.43  0.01  0.43  0.61 
Number of countries  85  88  88  84  82 
NB: The p-values in the parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All regressions 
include an intercept. 
 
The other variable that captures fiscal policy, namely the size of government, was also 
instrumented using the trade ratio, the dependency ratio, the urbanization rate, the log of 
total population, and the log of GDP per capita
11.  A key difference with the Fatas-Mihov 
paper consists in using trade as an instrument for the size of government. In general, 
Fatas and Mihov estimations include simultaneously both openness and government size, 
leading to non-robust statistical results on these coefficients.  Indeed, following Rodrik 
(1998), a more open economy increases the vulnerability of domestic agents and hence 
governments will have more pressure to spend.  Hence, in some of our specifications, the 
size of government was instrumented with the trade variable. 
 
5  Consumption Volatility and Fiscal Policy: Results 
 
Initially a cross-section of countries is used, using the average of the variables for the 
period 1960-2005.  In order to exploit the time dimension of the data, the sample was 
then split in three 15-year sub-periods, and the model was estimated by panel methods. 
5.1  Cross-country results  
 
The cross-country regressions used two alternative measures of the volatility of fiscal 
policy: the individual time-series regressions estimates, and the panel estimates.  Results 
are very similar: panel estimates are reported in Table 4, while time-series specifications 
are mentioned in Appendix 3. 
 
                                                 
11 The variables are described in more details (including sources) in Appendix 1.   11
                                                
Table 4 below shows the regression results, and is divided in three panels: the first one, 
labeled OLS, covers the 4 first columns and refers to basic Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions with various controls.  The second panel, labeled IV-1, covers columns (5) to 
(8) and refers to Instrumental Variables regressions, using instruments for the volatility of 
fiscal policy.  The third panel, labeled IV-2, covers columns (9) to (11) and reports the 
results of three IV regressions instrumenting both the volatility of fiscal policy and 
government size. 
 
The main results of our analysis are as follows: 
 
1-  Whatever method is used and whatever control variables are included, the 
fiscal policy volatility is always highly significant, as least at the 90% level of 
confidence
12, with a positive sign. This is a confirmation of the very strong 
(positive) and significant impact of the volatility of public spending on the 
volatility of consumption. Despite the high number of specifications that are 
considered, the parameter estimates for the volatility of fiscal policy are 
similar, clustering in the 0.3-0.5 interval, apart from the regressions where no 
additional controls are included. 
 
2-  The volatility of income is always significant – at the 99% level of confidence 
– with a strong (positive) parameter estimate, whereas the persistence of 
shocks is never so. 
 
3-  The level of financial development, as measured by the ratio of liabilities to 
GDP is not significant, but the volatility of the financial liabilities is always 
significant, at least at the 95% level of confidence, with the expected sign 
(positive). Capital account openness is always significant, at least at the 90% 
level of confidence, again with the expected sign (negative). 
 
4-  The parameter estimates and the level of significance of the trade and 
government size variables vary considerably.
 
12 The only case when this is not the case is the IV regression with instruments for the volatility of fiscal 
policy and all the control variables included at the same time. The lack of significance of the volatility of 
fiscal policy in this case may be due to some colinearity between our regressors. Table 4- Cross-country regressions using fiscal policy volatility calculated with a panel regression 
 
OLS IV-1  IV-2  Dependent variable: log of 
volatility of consumption 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Fiscal policy volatility 
(calculated with a panel 
regression) 
0.656 0.455 0.503 0.338 0.653  0.436 0.401 0.072 0.384  0.515 0.260 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.056) (0.803) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.048) 
Government size     0.266  0.233  0.189     0.312 0.278 0.128 0.118 0.551 0.235 
      (0.047)  (0.070)  (0.161)     (0.027)  (0.042)  (0.515)  (0.600)  (0.021)  (0.242) 
Trade     0.0702  0.218  0.137     -0.00607  0.169  0.125         
      (0.397)  (0.013)  (0.060)     (0.948)  (0.063)  (0.099)         
Volatility of income     0.495    0.464     0.561    0.620 0.599    0.550 
      (0.000)    (0.000)     (0.001)    (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) 
Persistence of income     0.151    0.106     0.158    0.0809 0.168    0.124 
      (0.118)    (0.272)     (0.112)    (0.453) (0.094)    (0.170) 
Financial liabilities        0.101  0.144        0.0212 -0.00250      0.0684  0.0995 
         (0.274)  (0.075)        (0.890)  (0.986)     (0.633)  (0.347) 
Volatility of financial liabilities        0.341  0.239       0.370  0.275     0.355  0.258 
         (0.000)  (0.006)        (0.002)  (0.011)     (0.000)  (0.004) 
Financial openness        -0.189  -0.175        -0.240 -0.265      -0.190 -0.183 
         (0.044)  (0.030)        (0.048)  (0.024)     (0.078)  (0.024) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.64  0.75  0.75  0.80 0.63  0.74 0.74 0.77 0.74  0.73 0.78 
Test of OID (p-value)  -  -  -  -  0.30  0.39 0.27 0.59 0.76  0.16 0.25 
Number of countries  84  83  81  80  77  76  75  74  75  75  74 
 
NB: The p-values in the parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. In the IV regressions, the over-identifying test (OID) reports the p-
value from the Sargan-Hansen J-test that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals. All regressions include an intercept. 5.2  Panel results 
 
In order to exploit the time dimension of our sample, we also estimated model (2) by 
panel regression, splitting the sample in three 15-year sub-periods: 1960-75, 1975-90, and 
1990-2005. The choice of these three sub-periods is arbitrary, but is similar to Wolf’s 
(2004) decadal analysis. 
 
The definition of the variables was the following: 
 
¾  The volatilities of fiscal policy and income were defined, for each country and 
each sub-period, using the same panel regressions as in the previous part – i.e. 
Equations (1) and (3) – as the standard deviation of the corresponding residual for 
each country and each sub-period. 
¾  This was not possible for the persistence of income – that was calculated using 
country time-series regressions – so we used the 1960-2005 average of this 
parameter for the 3 sub-periods 
¾  Most of the institutional variables that we used for instrumenting the volatility of 
fiscal policy were not available for the first sub-period. Indeed, three of the four 
variables that we are using – nature of the political system, nature of the electoral 
system and number of elections – were only available from 1975 onwards. 




These adjustments to the data have a cost in terms of the variety of specifications that we 
can use. Indeed, as long as a variable is assumed to be constant throughout the whole 
period 1960-2005, it will be dropped in any panel regression using fixed effects. This is 
the case for the instrumented volatility of fiscal policy – since some instruments are 
constant during the whole period due to lack of data – as well as the persistence of 
income. Therefore, in order to check the robustness of our results to the instrumentation 
of the volatility of fiscal policy, we did not include any fixed effects in our regressions.  
Instead, we used a basic pooling.  
 
The results of the panel regressions are shown in Table 5.  The first 4 columns are fixed-
effects panel OLS regressions. The next group of columns (IV-1) is the basic pooling 
with the instrumentation of fiscal policy volatility, and the last set of columns (IV-2) 
includes the instrumentation of government size as well. 
 
Table 5 shows that results are very similar to the cross-country estimations reported in 
Table 4.  All the variables have the expected signs and there are no major changes in the 
statistical significance of the coefficients by shifting from OLS to instrumental variable 
(IV) estimations. However, the magnitude of some of the coefficients varies significantly. 
For instance, the coefficient of the volatility of fiscal policy almost doubles as well as the 
coefficient of the volatility of financial liabilities. 
                                                 
13 We also ran the regressions using the three sub-period averages (when available) for each variable, but 
the lack of data significantly reduced the number of observations and the significance of our results. Table 5- Panel regressions using fiscal policy volatility calculated with a panel regression 
 
FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION  POOLING 
OLS IV-1  IV-2 
Dependent variable: log of 
volatility of consumption 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) (10)  (11) 
Fiscal policy volatility 
(calculated with a panel 
regression) 
0.299  0.210 0.229 0.146  0.673 0.487  0.428 0.0478 0.444  0.480 0.209 
   (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.107)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.046) 
Government size      0.254 0.304 0.263      0.266 0.289 0.208  0.167 0.543 0.329 
      (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.013)     (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.057)  (0.368)  (0.005)  (0.042) 
Trade     0.0183  0.215  0.242     0.00256  0.181  0.152         
      (0.840)  (0.142)  (0.043)     (0.972)  (0.011)  (0.017)         
Volatility of income      0.502  0.478      0.523  0.619  0.556    0.554 
       (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000) 
Persistence of income               0.133    -0.0153  0.144    0.0147
                (0.108)    (0.868)  (0.079)    (0.861) 
Financial liabilities        -0.163  -0.154        -0.187  -0.264    -0.166  -0.174 
         (0.074)  (0.071)        (0.058)  (0.038)     (0.074)  (0.036) 
Volatility of financial liabilities        0.00322  0.0397        0.209  0.154     0.227  0.154 
         (0.958)  (0.426)        (0.001)  (0.009)     (0.000)  (0.006) 
Financial openness        -0.227  -0.174        -0.107 -0.212      -0.0918  -0.149 
         (0.000)  (0.002)        (0.150)  (0.009)     (0.180)  (0.009) 
Dummy period 1              0.0831  -0.0522  -0.00853 -0.149 -0.0610  -0.0348  -0.157 
               (0.402)  (0.570)  (0.931)  (0.119)  (0.496)  (0.736)  (0.080) 
Dummy period 2              0.197  0.104  0.169 0.0349  0.109 0.131  0.0454
               (0.012)  (0.151)  (0.020)  (0.679)  (0.109)  (0.093)  (0.532) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.14  0.43  0.23  0.46  0.47 0.66  0.63  0.70 0.66 0.61 0.71 
Test of OID (p-value)              0.04 0.03  0.19  0.20 0.12 0.03 0.02 
Number of observations  248  241  195  194  227  218  190  187  215  190  187 
NB: The p-values in the parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. In the IV regressions, the over-identifying test (OID) reports the p-
value from the Sargan-Hansen J-test that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals. All regressions, except fixed-effects regressions, include an 
intercept. Some differences with the cross-country results are worth noting, however: 
 
1-  The persistence of income indicator turns significant in two of the panel 
specifications – using the income variables as controls, but excluding the financial 
variables.  
 
2-  The level of financial liabilities is always significant at the 90% level of 
significance – contrary to the cross-country regressions. The negative sign is as 
expected, and relates to the capacity of financial markets to smooth consumption. 
 
3-  In the panel regressions with fixed effects, the volatility of financial liabilities is not 
significant anymore – just the level of financial liabilities seems to matter. 
 
4-  P-values of the over-identifying tests are, in general, much lower than in the cross-
country regressions. This would mean that our instrumentation works better on the 
panel sample than on the cross-section sample. 
 
6  Conclusions and Directions for Future Work 
 
The volatility of household consumption is mostly explained by the volatility of income and 
that of fiscal policy.  Government size, as measured by public expenditure as a share of GDP, 
also affects positively consumption volatility.  The policy implications are clear: rules that 
stabilize public spending will also stabilize private consumption, with the corresponding 
welfare gain.  The impact of public spending volatility on private consumption volatility has 
implications for program or project evaluation: unless additional public spending is funded 
with spending cuts in other areas, it will imply higher private consumption volatility, with its 
implicit welfare cost. 
 
Additional work is needed to better understand this linkage.  Whether public spending 
volatility affects private consumption volatility because of labor supply effects – as in Gali 
(1994) – or through its impact on risk aversion and investment – as in Angeletos and Panousi 
(2007) – still needs to be verified in future micro research.  
 
These results provide support for policies that promote financial deepening and foster the 
development of capital markets that stabilize the growth of financial liabilities. An open capital 
account also leads to lower volatility of household consumption.   16
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Appendix 1: Description of the variables 
 
A-  Variables used for measuring the volatility of fiscal policy 
 
Growth rate of government spending: difference in the log
14 of the series General government final 
consumption expenditure (constant LCU) from the WDI 
Current output growth: difference in the log of the series GDP (constant LCU) from the WDI 
Inflation: difference in the log of the series GDP deflator (base year varies by country) from the WDI 
Index of oil prices (source: DECPG/Bank Wide Data) 
Real GDP per capita: log of series Real GDP per capita on PPP basis, from Penn World Tables, 
Pennsylvania University, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
 
B-  Variables used for estimating the volatility of household consumption 
 
Volatility of household consumption: log of standard deviation of the series Household final 
consumption expenditure per capita growth (annual %) from the WDI) 
Volatility of fiscal policy: log of the standard deviation of the residual from regression (1), using a 
cross-country or a panel specification. 
Nature of the electoral system: variable equal to 1 if the country has a majoritarian system, 0 else 
(source: World Bank Database of Political Institutions) 
Nature of the political system: variable equal to 1 if the country has a presidential system, 0 if it has a 
parliamentary system (source: World Bank Database of Political Institutions) 
Number of elections for the executive and legislative branches (source: World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions) 
Political constraints: Variable POLCONV from W.J. Henisz web-site: http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/) 
Government size: log of series General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) from 
the WDI 
Trade: log of sum of the series Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) and Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) from the WDI 
Volatility of income: log of the standard deviation of the residual from regression (3), using a panel 
specification. 
Persistence of income shocks: calculated as 1+α, where α comes from regression (3), using individual 
country time-series regressions 
Financial liabilities: log of the series Liquid Liabilities / GDP from the World Bank Database on 
Financial Development and Structure 
Volatility of financial liabilities: standard deviation of the difference in log of the series Liquid 
Liabilities / GDP from the World Bank Database on Financial Development and Structure. 
Financial openness: defined as ln(2+C), where C is the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Variable 
(source: Chinn and Ito, "A New Measure of Financial Openness" (2007), 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html) 
Dependency ratio: series Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population) from the WDI 
Urbanization rate: series Urban population (% of total) from the WDI 
Population: log of series Population, total from the WDI 
                                                 
14 Throughout the paper, variables are considered most of the time in log terms, so that the corresponding 
parameter estimates can be interpreted as elasticities.   19
Appendix 2: Comparison of various measures of the volatility of fiscal policy 
 
The measures of fiscal policy volatility using the four methods are as follows. 
 
   Time Series  Panel 
   OLS IV  OLS  IV 
Algeria 0.069  0.072 0.045  0.071
Argentina 0.027  0.027 0.036 0.040
Australia 0.019  0.023 0.012  0.022
Austria 0.010  0.013 0.011  0.012
Bangladesh 0.107  0.175 0.024  0.191
Belgium 0.016  0.034 0.012  0.019
Benin 0.095  0.098 0.018  0.101
Bolivia 0.044  0.067 0.043  0.056
Botswana 0.039  0.049 0.021  0.046
Brazil 0.074  0.075 0.044  0.084
Burkina Faso  0.110  0.111 0.019  0.120
Burundi 0.154  0.210 0.036  0.175
Cameroon 0.091  0.091 0.035  0.099
Canada 0.017  0.018 0.012  0.022
Chad 0.104  0.106 0.043  0.177
Chile 0.032  0.038 0.036  0.044
China 0.050  0.051 0.028  0.061
Colombia 0.063  0.114 0.014  0.073
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.138  0.142 0.049  0.169
Congo, Rep.  0.128 0.129 0.032  0.146
Costa Rica  0.019  0.019 0.021 0.026
Cote d'Ivoire  0.059  0.062 0.032  0.091
Denmark 0.016  0.016 0.013  0.019
Dominican Republic  0.125  0.134 0.033  0.130
Ecuador 0.064  0.082 0.019  0.090
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.051 0.060 0.016  0.065
El Salvador  0.088  0.091 0.026  0.095
Finland 0.016  0.016 0.016  0.021
France 0.009  0.009 0.011  0.013
Gabon 0.105  0.139 0.055 0.119
Gambia, The  0.087  0.103 0.020  0.113
Germany 0.012  0.012 0.010  0.016
Ghana 0.120  0.140 0.028 0.129
Greece 0.034  0.035 0.023  0.040
Guatemala 0.054  0.056 0.016 0.046
Guinea-Bissau 0.122  0.143 0.050  0.153
Guyana 0.211  0.623 (*) (*) 
Honduras 0.062  0.074 0.018 0.074
Hong Kong, China  0.031  0.033 0.025  0.036
Hungary 0.052  0.068 0.025  0.060
Iceland 0.020  0.020 0.023  0.027
India 0.049  0.051 0.017 0.053
Indonesia 0.081  0.083 0.031 0.107  20
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.063  0.139 0.043  0.115
Ireland 0.024  0.032 0.015  0.035
Italy 0.012  0.012 0.014  0.017
Japan 0.016  0.027 0.022  0.020
Kenya 0.071  0.075 0.027  0.079
Korea, Rep.  0.022 0.022 0.021  0.030
Lesotho 0.110  0.110 0.039 0.131
Luxembourg 0.018  0.020 0.018  0.024
Madagascar 0.053  0.059 0.026  0.064
Malawi 0.074  0.089 0.031  0.108
Malaysia 0.054  0.070 0.020  0.058
Mali 0.116  0.116 0.032  0.147
Mauritania 0.165 0.173 0.025  0.190
Mexico 0.022  0.022 0.025  0.031
Morocco 0.063  0.065 0.026  0.072
Netherlands 0.013  0.018 0.012  0.017
New Zealand  0.026  0.027 0.018  0.027
Nicaragua 0.105  0.111 0.067  0.138
Niger 0.097  0.104 0.038  0.104
Nigeria 0.182  0.222 0.043  0.198
Norway 0.016  0.016 0.010  0.017
Pakistan 0.075  0.083 0.014  0.089
Papua New Guinea  0.065  0.065 0.030  0.076
Paraguay 0.109  0.290 0.022  0.115
Peru 0.058  0.068 0.051  0.073
Philippines 0.033  0.041 0.019  0.044
Portugal 0.024  0.034 0.020  0.029
Rwanda 0.189  0.232 0.078  0.222
Senegal 0.048  0.049 0.024  0.054
South Africa  0.025 0.025 0.016  0.030
Spain 0.015  0.015 0.016  0.022
Sri Lanka  0.070  0.072 0.010  0.089
Sudan 0.091  0.092 0.038  0.134
Sweden 0.014  0.015 0.012  0.020
Switzerland 0.014  0.015 0.014  0.017
Syrian Arab Republic  0.080  0.082 0.030  0.114
Taiwan, China  0.025  0.025 0.021  0.037
Thailand 0.041  0.047 0.023  0.044
Togo 0.121  0.121 0.034  0.135
Trinidad and Tobago  0.067  0.067 0.025  0.079
Tunisia 0.028  0.071 0.020  0.030
United Kingdom  0.014  0.021 0.011  0.020
United States  0.017 0.018 0.012  0.024
Uruguay 0.040  0.042 0.027 0.056
Venezuela, RB  0.081 0.088 0.035  0.092
Zambia 0.172  0.299 0.029  0.188
Zimbabwe 0.167  0.169 0.044  0.195
 
With the above estimates of fiscal policy volatility, the countries can be ranked, and we can 
compare our rankings with two benchmarks:   21
-  basic ranking using the standard deviation of the growth rate of government spending 
between 1960-2005 (series General government final consumption expenditure (annual 
% growth) from the WDI); 
-  Fatas-Mihov ranking (available on Fatas’ website, using the methodology described in 
the paper “The case for restricting fiscal policy discretion”. 
 
The rankings that we get are as follows (top-ranked countries have the lowest volatility of 
fiscal policy). 
 
   Benchmarks Time  series  Panel 
   Basic St Dev  Fatas-Mihov  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
   A B  C  D  E  F 
France 1  1  1  1  4  2
Austria 2  2  2  4  6  1
Netherlands 3  6  5  11  12  6
United Kingdom  4  10  8  16  5  11
Germany 5  8  4  3  3  3
Italy 6  17  3  2  14  4
Spain 7  13  9  6  19  15
Norway 8  14  11  8  2  5
Japan 9  4  14  21  37  12
Sweden 10  3  6  5  7  10
United States  11  9  16  12  10  17
Finland 12  16  10  9  23  13
Belgium 13  7  13  27  9  9
Australia 14  15  18  19  11  16
Denmark 15  11  12  10  13  8
Canada 16  12  15  13  8  14
Korea, Rep.  17  56  21  18  35  24
Iceland 18  25  19  15  39  20
New Zealand  19  21  25  23  27  19
Switzerland 20  5  7  7  16  7
Tunisia 21  39  27  46  32  23
Argentina 22  82  26  22  66  28
Ireland 23  18  22  24  18  26
South Africa  24  33  24  20  20  22
Costa Rica  25  27  17  14  36  18
Chile 26  47  29  29  68  32
Hong Kong, China  27  23  28  25  46  27
Greece 28  22  31  28  40  29
Mexico 29  24  20  17  47  25
Portugal 30  19  23  26  33  21
Philippines 31  30  30  30  30  31
India 32  20  37  35  24  35
Thailand 33  29  34  32  41  30
Botswana 34  40  32  34  34  33
Guatemala 35  36  41  36  22  34
Senegal 36  72  36  33  42  36
Uruguay 37  49  33  31  52  38
Malaysia 38  35  40  45  31  39  22
Bolivia 39  52  35  43  73  37
Honduras 40  32  44  49  25  46
Colombia 41  54  46  66  15  44
Egypt, Arab Rep.  42  37  38  38  21  41
Madagascar 43  57  39  37  49  40
Peru 44  50  42  44  79  45
Papua New Guinea  45  45  48  40  56  47
El Salvador  46  28  59  58  50  56
Morocco 47  41  45  41  48  43
Sri Lanka  48  42  51  47  1  52
Brazil 49  53  54  51  75  50
Kenya 50  26  52  50  51  48
Trinidad and Tobago  51  60  49  42  44  49
Pakistan 52  38  55  55  17  51
Cameroon 53  46  60  59  65  57
Benin 54  51  61  60  26  58
Malawi 55  80  53  57  57  61
Syrian Arab Republic  56  43  56  53  55  62
Cote d'Ivoire  57  31  43  39  60  54
Ecuador 58  55  47  52  28  53
Algeria 59  34  50  48  76  42
Niger 60  59  62  61  69  59
Venezuela, RB  61  61  57  56  64  55
Indonesia 62  48  58  54  58  60
Paraguay 63  44  67  81  38  63
Togo 64  69  72  68  63  69
Ghana 65  62  71  72  53  66
Burkina Faso  66  68  69  64  29  65
Chad 67  65  63  62  71  76
Gabon 68  78  64  71  80  64
Nicaragua 69  73  65  65  81  70
Congo, Rep.  70  70  75  69  61  71
Guinea-Bissau 71  64  73  74  78  73
Lesotho 72  58  68  63  70  68
Zambia 73  77  80  82  54  77
Mauritania 74  66  78  76  45  78
Burundi 75  74  77  78  67  75
Congo, Dem. Rep.  76  79  76  73  77  74
Nigeria 77  76  81  79  72  81
Zimbabwe 78  63  79  75  74  80
Dominican Republic  79  71  74  70  62  67
Rwanda 80  67  82  80  82  82
Mali 81  75  70  67  59  72
Bangladesh 82  81  66  77  43  79
 
The rank-correlations between the series are as follows: 
A-B: 0.85; C-A: 0.98; C-B: 0.84; D-A: 0.95; D-B: 0.83; E-A: 0.74; E-B: 0.74; F-A: 0.98; F-B: 
0.86Appendix 3: Cross-country regressions using fiscal policy volatility calculated with individual country time-series 
regressions 
OLS IV-1  IV-2  Dependent variable: log of 
volatility of consumption 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Fiscal policy volatility 
(calculated with individual 
country time-series regressions) 
0.577 0.338 0.375 0.206  0.667 0.449 0.546 0.159 0.326 0.526 0.221 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.601) (0.001) (0.000) (0.047) 
Government size      0.237 0.212 0.149      0.410 0.451 0.198  0.0261 0.483  0.176 
       (0.118) (0.161) (0.330)      (0.005) (0.012) (0.359) (0.904) (0.091) (0.396) 
Trade     0.0228  0.229  0.126     -0.0659  0.0400  0.0808         
      (0.790)  (0.021)  (0.101)     (0.483)  (0.822)  (0.455)         
Volatility of income     0.647    0.560    0.586    0.595  0.673    0.596 
      (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000) 
Persistence of income     0.130    0.0761     0.124    0.0791 0.129    0.0952 
      (0.197)    (0.454)    (0.235)    (0.423)  (0.222)    (0.308) 
Financial liabilities        0.0372  0.102        0.103 0.0423      0.0939  0.0995 
         (0.666)  (0.191)        (0.511)  (0.794)     (0.456)  (0.347) 
Volatility of financial liabilities        0.392  0.264       0.353  0.263      0.365  0.259 
         (0.000)  (0.003)        (0.000)  (0.015)     (0.000)  (0.005) 
Financial openness        -0.245  -0.213        -0.166 -0.229      -0.174 -0.188 
         (0.012)  (0.007)        (0.313)  (0.084)     (0.140)  (0.019) 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.58 0.72 0.71 0.78 0.55 0.71  0.69 0.77 0.71 0.69 0.77 
Test of OID (p-value)  -  -  -  - 0.50  0.61  0.56  0.63  0.89  0.23  0.35 
Number of countries  85  83  82  80  78  76  76  74  75  76  74 
 
NB: The p-values in the parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. In the IV regressions, the over-identifying test (OID) reports the p-
value from the Sargan-Hansen J-test that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals. All regressions include an intercept. 